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ABSTRACT 
With increased dependency on the Internet, cyber attacks are fast becoming an attractive 
option for state adversaries, in part because of the ease of hiding a perpetrator’s identity. 
In response, governments around the world are taking measures to improve their national 
cyber defenses. However, these defenses, which are generally passive in nature, have 
been insufficient to address the threats. This thesis explores the possibility of employing 
active cyber defenses to improve cyber defenses at the national level. Active cyber 
defense refers to the use of offensive actions, such as counter hacking and pre-emptive 
hacking, among others, to defend against cyber attacks. This thesis studies the typologies 
of active cyber defense and examines how this approach can enhance a state’s cyber 
defense posture.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. PURPOSE AND SCOPE 
The purpose of this thesis is to study the benefits of applying active cyber 
defenses to enhance cyber defenses at a national level. Based on the definition from the 
U.S. DoD Dictionary of Military Terms, active defense refers to the employment of 
limited offensive action and counterattacks to deny a contested area or position to the 
enemy.1 Thus, active cyber defense would refer to the use of offensive cyber actions, 
such as counter hacking or pre-emptive hacking, among others, within cyberspace to 
achieve a similar outcome. The thesis examines the limitations of existing passive 
defenses such as firewalls, intrusion detection/prevention systems, patching, and auditing. 
It then explores different types of active defenses, examines their strengths and 
weaknesses, and studies how they can contribute to the cyber defense posture.  
B. BACKGROUND 
Cyber attacks are becoming an attractive option for the enemies of a state, social 
movements, terrorists, etc. One reason is the ever-increasing reliance on computers and 
the Internet; for governments and militaries around the world, these systems have become 
easy targets.2 It has been reported that more than one hundred countries are trying to 
break into the United States’ government networks, and that NATO headquarters receives 
more than one hundred cyber attacks each day.3 Another reason for an adversary’s 
interest in cyber attacks is the ease of hiding a perpetrator’s identify on the Internet. 
Many cyber attacks are launched via compromised computers, thereby masking the origin 
of the attacks. For example, in the cyber attacks against Georgia in 2008, the distributed 
                                                
1 U.S. DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary/data/a/2043.html. 
2 Lawrence Gershwin, “Cyber Threat Trends and U.S. Network Security,” Statement for the Record to 
the Joint Economic Committee, National Intelligence Council, 21 June 2001, 
http://www.dni.gov/nic/testimony_cyberthreat.html. 
3 Siobhan Gorman and Stephen Fidler, “Cyber Attacks Test U.S, Allies, and Foes,” Wall Street 
Journal, 25 September 2010, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703793804575511961264943300.html. 
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denial of service (DDOS) attacks were traced to multiple “hacked” computers around the 
world. These compromised computers, or bots, were victims themselves, providing a 
protective layer between the attacker and the target systems in Georgia.4 Another similar 
example was the cyber attacks on Estonia in 2007. This issue of attribution is further 
complicated by various privacy and international laws, or lack thereof, around the world.5 
In response, governments worldwide have taken measures to improve their 
national cyber defenses. President Obama identified cyber attacks as one of the most 
serious economic and national security challenges that the United States faces. The 
administration reviewed cyber policies and programs, releasing the Comprehensive 
National Cybersecurity Initiative.6 Also, the U.S. Cyber Command was set up, achieving 
full operational capability on November 3, 2010.7 In Europe, NATO established the 
Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence in May 2008 to enhance NATO’s cyber 
defense capabilities. The center’s mission is to enhance capability, cooperation and 
information sharing among NATO’s partners through education, research and 
development, lessons learned and consultation.8 In addition, many Information 
Technology (IT) security vendors have offered innovative products to enhance cyber 
security.  
Despite such measures, the number of cyber attacks is still on the rise. Cyber 
defense can spread across a wide spectrum, ranging from prevention and response to 
deterrence and investigation. Today, existing cyber defenses are generally passive in 
nature, thereby failing to extend across the full range of operations. This is unlike 
traditional war fighting, in which active defenses are utilized as part of a state’s defense. 
                                                
4 “Overview by the U.S.-CCU of the Cyber Campaign Against Georgia in August of 2008,” U.S.-
Cyber Consequence Unit Special Report, August 2009. 
5 Duncan B. Hollis and David G. Post, “Do Cyber-Attacks Require a Duty to Assist?” Law 
Technology News, 29 April 29 2010, 
http://www.law.com/jsp/lawtechnologynews/PubArticleLTN.jsp?id=1202453759405&slreturn=1&hbxlogi
n=1. 
6 “The Comphrehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative,” National Security Council, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/cybersecurity/comprehensive-national-cybersecurity-initiative. 
7 “Cyber Command achieves full operational capability,” Air Force Space Command, 3 November, 
2010, http://www.afspc.af.mil/pressreleasearchive/story.asp?id=123229293. 
8 NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Center of Excellence, http://www.ccdcoe.org. 
 3 
As Abraham Sofaer highlighted in his book The Best Defense? Legitimacy and 
Preventive Force, states have long conducted preventive wars as forms of defense.9  
In a similar regard, in the National Research Council (NRC) report, “Technology, 
Policy, Law, and Ethics Regarding U.S. Acquisition and Use of Cyberattack 
Capabilities,” the authors briefly touched on various active cyber defenses, such as non-
cooperative intelligence gathering, counterstrike, and preemptive defense.10 Non-
cooperative intelligence gathering refers to the gathering of information about the attack 
and the attacker through the use of any tools or means. Counterstrike refers to counter 
hacking of an attacker’s system. Preemptive defense refers to the conduct of an attack on 
an adversary’s system/network in imminent anticipation of the adversary conducting an 
attack on the victim’s own system.11 Although these actions are highly controversial,12 
particularly in terms of legality and legitimacy, they may be able to contribute and offer 
something new to an overall cyber defense posture.  
As such, this thesis seeks to determine how active cyber defense can help in 
defending against cyber attacks. 
C. METHODOLOGY 
The thesis will study the different types of cyber attacks and the current state of 
defenses against them. It will explore the different typologies of active cyber defense and 
                                                
9 Abraham D. Sofaer, The Best Defense? Legitimacy and Preventive Force (Stanford, CA: Hoover 
Institution Press, 2010), 32–52. 
10 William A. Owens, Kenneth W. Dam, and Herbert S. Lin, “Technology, Policy, Law, and Ethics 
Regarding U.S. Acquisition and Use of Cyberattack Capabilities,” National Research Council (Washington, 
D.C.: The National Academies Press, 2009), 142–149.  
Note that while the authors refer to preemptive defense in the report, it is likely that they meant 
preventive defense instead. Based on the definition by Abraham Sofaer, a preventive strike is the “use of 
force against an anticipated attack based on a judgment that the attacker will use existing or potential means 
to attack in the future, or to engender other types of harm, including, for example, harm to hostages, attacks 
by non-state actors, or the mistreatment by a State of its own nationals.” As for preemptive strike, it refers 
to strikes that uses “force against an attack that is believed to be imminent based on evidence that hostile 
action has begun or is about to occur.”  
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid., 239–241. 
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discuss what they can offer. It will then discuss three cases of cyber attack and illustrate 
the key benefits that active cyber defenses could have offered for each of the cases. 
D. OVERVIEW 
Chapter I introduces the purpose and scope of the thesis, i.e. to study the benefits 
of employing active cyber defenses as a complement to passive cyber defenses in order to 
better counter cyber attacks at a national level. It also provides some background on the 
current state of cyber defense. 
Chapter II discusses the different types of cyber attacks and the passive defenses 
that are customarily used against them. It will highlight some of the limitations and 
challenges of these defenses. The chapter will then touch on the specific difficulties 
encountered in actual cases of cyber attacks. 
Chapter III lays out the different typologies of active cyber defense. These are 
cyber exploitation, counter hack, preemptive cyber attack, and preventive cyber attack. 
For each of the typologies, their characteristics, strengths and weaknesses will be 
examined. The chapter will then discuss how these methods can help in an overall cyber 
defense posture. 
Chapter IV examines three major cases of cyber attacks and study how active 
cyber defense could have helped in defending against the attacks. The cases are: 
GhostNet,13 the worm that carried out cyber espionage; cyber attacks that occurred 
against Estonia in 2007;14 and Stuxnet,15 the worm targeted at disrupting industrial 
control systems. 
                                                
13 “Tracking GhostNet: Investigating a Cyber Espionage Network,” Information Warfare Monitor, 29 
March 2009, http://www.infowar-monitor.net/ghostnet. 
14 Roland Heickero, “Emerging Cyber Threats and Russian Views on Information Warfare and 
Information Operations,” 2010. 




Chapter V summarizes the findings of the earlier chapters and reviews the 
benefits of active cyber defense. In conclusion, it will also highlight some possible areas 
for further research. 
 6 
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II. UNDERSTANDING CYBER ATTACK AND DEFENSE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Cyber attacks are generally considered to be attacks on computer systems and 
networks. The attacks can originate from individuals, groups, and nation-states for a 
variety of reasons. Regardless of motivation, they often aim to alter or steal information, 
or to disrupt the computer system or network. As there is a wide range of attacks of 
varying magnitude, this chapter will focus on the more noteworthy types. It will also 
discuss current defenses against them and examine particular cyber attacks that had 
significant impact. 
B. TYPES OF CYBER ATTACK 
1. Web Defacement 
Web defacements are attacks that alter the contents of a website or hijack its 
domain name, redirecting users to a false site. As reported by Zone-H, a website archive 
of versions of defaced websites, the number of web defacement attacks has been rising 
consistently. There were 300,000 web defacements recorded in 2003. However, in 2010, 
the numbers increased to an astounding 1,400,000.16 Until May 2011, there had already 
been approximately 400,000 defacements reported (see Figure 1).  The attackers range 
from script kiddies17 to the politically motivated skilled hackers.   
                                                
16 Zone-H.org, “Unrestricted information, Yearly & Monthly & Daily attacks,” http://www.zone-
h.org/stats/ymd. 
17 In a Carnegie Mellon report prepared for the U.S. Department of Defense in 2005, script kiddies are 
defined as “the more immature but unfortunately often just as dangerous exploiter of security lapses on the 
Internet. The typical script kiddy uses existing and frequently well known and easy-to-find techniques and 
programs or scripts to search for and exploit weaknesses in other computers on the Internet - often 
randomly and with little regard or perhaps even understanding of the potentially harmful consequences.” 
See Nancy Mead, Eric Hough, and Theodore Stehney, “Requirements Engineering (Square) Methodology), 




Figure 1.   Number of web defacement attacks from January 2003 to October 201118 
A good example of politically motivated web defacement occurred during the war 
against Iraq in 2003. According to F-Secure, web defacements started forty-eight hours 
preceding the attack on Iraq, and continued to increase during the war. The site F-Secure 
classified the responsible hackers into three groups: U.S.-based patriotic hackers, Islamic 
extremist groups from around the world, and peace activitists who were against the war.19 
Figure 2 shows the number of web defacements that occurred during the tenth to twelfth 
weeks of the war against Iraq. 
                                                
18 “Unrestricted information| Yearly & Monthly & Daily Attacks,” http://www.zone-h.org/stats/ymd. 




Figure 2.   Number of web defacements during week 10–1220 
In another example, the hacker group “Iranian Cyber Army” hijacked the Voice 
of America (VOA) website in February 2011, posting a statement demanding that the 
U.S. Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, listen to “the voice of oppressed nations” and 
“stop interfering in Islamic countries.” This group was also responsible for hijacking 
Twitter in December 2009.21  
2. Denial of Service/Distributed Denial of Service (DDOS) 
Denial of service (DOS) attacks aim to cripple or disrupt access to their targets. 
Typically this is achieved by consuming the bandwidth of the target’s network or 
exhausting resources on the target’s system.22 Often, DOS attacks are carried out via 
botnets, which are networks of compromised machines that have been infected with 
                                                
20 “Iraq War and Information Security,” http://www.f-secure.com/virus-info/iraq.shtml. 
21 William Ide, “Iranian Hackers Attack VOA Internet Sites,” Voice of America, 22 February 2011, 
http://www.voanews.com/english/news/usa/Iranian-Hackers-Attack-VOA-Internet-Sites-116678844.html. 
22 “Uses of botnet,” The Honeynet Project, 10 August 2008, http://www.honeynet.org/node/52. 
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malware and placed under control of the attacker. Botnets tend to stay dormant until they 
are given some tasks from their command and control server, which can be located in any 
part of the world.  They are most often used to send spam, but they are also used for fraud 
and to perform denial of service attacks, with the botnet as a whole conducting what is 
then called a distributed denial of service (DDOS) attack.23 
3. Malware (Malicious Software) Attack 
This classification includes various forms of malware such as viruses, worms, and 
Trojans.24 Viruses are programs that can attach themselves to other software and then 
replicate when that software is executed. The effects can range from stealing sensitive 
information to causing disruption. Worms are self-replicating malware. They can scan for 
vulnerable systems and exploit them. They can also spread via removable devices such as 
USB thumb drives, an example being the Stuxnet worm. Trojans are malicious code 
hidden inside legitimate software to avoid detection. Often these are backdoors that allow 
the attacker full/remote access to the systems that are infected. Although they do not 
spread on their own, they can reach millions of targets through spam and web downloads. 
An example of this is the Zeus Trojan.25 
4. Zero-Day Attacks  
These attacks occur when an attacker (humans or artificial-intelligence controlled 
malware) exploits a computer system through an unpublished vulnerability for which no 
patch (fix) has been issued.26 While such attacks are much less frequent than those that 
exploit known vulnerabilities for which the vendors have released patches, they are far 
more difficult to detect and defend against since their signatures will not be incorporated 
 
 
                                                
23 “Botnets,” Shadowserver, http://www.shadowserver.org/wiki/pmwiki.php/Information/Botnets. 
24 “Glossary,” McAfee, http://home.mcafee.com/VirusInfo/Glossary.aspx. 
25 Elinor Mills, “Zeus Trojan Steals $1 Million from U.K. Bank Accounts,” CNET, 10 August 2010, 
http://news.cnet.com/8301–27080_3–20013246–245.html. 
26 Tony Bradley, “Zero Day Exploits,” Internet/Network Sercurity, About.com, 
http://netsecurity.about.com/od/newsandeditorial1/a/aazeroday.htm. 
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into anti-malware products. Moreover, even after a vendor has discovered or been 
notified of a security flaw, it may take some time before a security update is developed 
and released.  
C. TYPES OF CYBER DEFENSE 
Many IT security product vendors have been rigorously promoting cutting-edge 
security solutions and products to defend against various forms of cyber attacks. In 
addition, organizations have been tightening and enforcing more stringent policies. Such 
policies cover the storage and handling of classified data, background screening of 
individuals involved in sensitive job functions, password requirements, types of personal 
communication devices allowed, types of data allowed to flow between networks, and the 
frequency in which servers should be patched.27 Table 1 briefly describes some of the 
current defense strategies for the types of attacks mentioned in the previous section. 
                                                
27 “Information Security Policy Templates,” SANS, http://www.sans.org/security-resources/policies. 
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Table 1.   Defenses against cyber attacks. 
Attack Type Recommended defenses – Policies and Technology  
Web Defacement -­‐ Ensure servers are patched regularly -­‐ Ensure web scripts are well written  -­‐ Check user input to prevent SQL (Structured Query 
Language) injection28 -­‐ Deploy software to automatically restore baseline copy 
of defaced web pages, e.g., Tripwire Remediation 
Manager29  
DDOS -­‐ Ensure servers are patched regularly -­‐ Have firewalls filter out malformed packets -­‐ Maintain a Blacklist of attacking IP addresses -­‐ Have bandwidth redundancy  -­‐ Use load distribution and abnormal request filtering, 
e.g., Akamai30  
Malware attack -­‐ Have firewalls filter out malformed packets -­‐ Deploy Intrusion Detection System (IDS) / Intrusion 
Prevention System (IPS) / Anti-Virus (AV), and ensure 
their signatures are updated regularly -­‐ Monitor network traffic  -­‐ Use application white listing, e.g., Bouncer31  
Zero-day attack -­‐ Deploy an anomaly monitoring system, e.g., 
Netwitness32 
                                                
28 SQL injection is an attack in which malicious code is inserted into instances of SQL server for 
parsing and execution. See MSDN, Microsoft, http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms161953.aspx. 
29 “Automated Correction of Bad IT Configurations,” Tripwire, http://www.tripwire.com/it-
compliance-products/te/remediation/. 
30 “Akamai Security Solutions,” Akamai, 
http://www.akamai.com/html/solutions/security/ddos_defense.html. 
31 “Introducing Bouncer by CoreTrace,” CoreTrace, 
http://www.coretrace.com/products/BOUNCER_by_CoreTrace/default.aspx. 
32 “Spectrum,” Netwitness, http://netwitness.com/products-services/spectrum. 
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A cyber attack is often multifaceted since it can involve a combination of the 
attacks mentioned above. For example, in the case of a worm attack, it could spread by 
exploiting misconfigured servers, or exploiting both known and unknown (zero-day) 
vulnerabilities. After the initial attacks, malware such as Trojans and backdoors could be 
installed in the compromised systems. Such malware could also spread through 
removable devices as in the case of Stuxnet, or through spam or web downloads. Once 
installed, the malware could communicate with remote servers to receive instructions for 
data collection, sabotage, or conducting DDOS attacks. All these signify the complexities 
and sophistication of cyber attacks and suggest that existing defenses may not be 
sufficient. 
D. THE REALITY 
Based on the U.S. Defense Department Military Dictionary, passive defense 
refers to “measures taken to reduce the probability of and to minimize the effects of 
damage caused by hostile action without the intention of taking the initiative.”33 These 
measures are exactly what the above defensive strategies are about. The 
recommendations serve to prevent or limit the impact of a cyber attack. When defenses 
are properly implemented, they may help with forensic investigation and damage control, 
shorten the time for response and recovery, and deter future attacks. 
Unfortunately, results of these measures have not been optimal as shown by the 
continual increase in the number of cyber attacks. None of the above defenses has been 
fully successful. 
1. Increased Opportunities 
With the number of vulnerabilities increasing over the years as reported by the 
IBM X-Force34 (see Figure 3), there are more opportunities for potential attackers than 
ever before.  
                                                
33 “Passive Defense,” Answers.com, http://www.answers.com/topic/passive-defense. 
34 The IBM X-Force is a R&D team that studies and monitors the latest threat trends including 




Figure 3.   Vulnerabilities growth by year 
Apart from the increase in vulnerabilities, the attacks are also becoming more 
sophisticated. To make matters worse, vendors require time to develop and test their 
security updates before offering them to their customers. And, at the enterprise level, 
additional tests are needed to ensure the security updates are compatible with all existing 
components and do not disrupt functionality. As such, there is often a fairly large window 
of opportunity for attacks to continue to be effective. Adding to this window of 
opportunity is the fact that often vulnerabilities remain undisclosed for a period of time.35   
2. Difficulty in Detection and Filtration 
Another reality is that it is difficult to detect something that exploits an unknown 
vulnerability or uses a new avenue of attack. Moreover, it is difficult to defend the 
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perimeter of the network without knowing from where an attack originates. Thus, such a 
perimeter defense becomes very reactive and may not be able to shut down an attack. For 
example, an attacker can first launch a series of attacks on a target from IP addresses 
originating from Europe. The target, upon detecting the origin of these attacks, can 
immediately configure new rules on its firewall to drop incoming traffic from those IP 
addresses. However, the attacker can easily overcome this by utilizing IP addresses from 
another location. This shows that such a blacklisting approach is not very effective. 
Another approach would be to make use of white listing.36 However, depending on the 
nature of the business, such an approach may not always be applicable. For example, in 
the case of the website of a ministry of foreign affairs, it would be difficult to have a 
white list, since the website needs to be accessible from all addresses.  
Furthermore, skilled attackers can utilize sophisticated covert channels37 to ensure 
their activities remain obscure and hidden from network traffic monitoring systems 
and/or intrusion detection systems.  An example of such a channel is the HTTP Tunnel. 
Utilizing this application, an attacker can disguise his traffic to look like regular web 
surfing traffic, thereby preventing detection by the network monitoring systems.38 
While there are new defense technologies such as behavioral analysis and 
anomaly detection, they are not mature as yet and often lead to many false positives.  
3. Attribution  
Apart from detecting the attack signal itself, the other challenge is attribution. 
This problem can be divided into two parts: technical attribution and human attribution.39 
Technical attribution involves the analysis of technical components of the cyber attack to 
trace and locate the IP address of the machine originating the attack. Human attribution 
                                                
36 The use of a white list refers to the maintenance of a list of allowed IP addresses, as opposed to a 
black list, which is a list of disallowed IP addresses. 
37 A covert channel is a communication channel that is hidden or disguised within a legitimate 
communication channel. See http://www.sans.org/reading_room/whitepapers/covert/. 
38 HTTP Tunnel, http://www.http-tunnel.com/html/. 
39 W. Earl Boebert, “A Survey of Challenges in Attribution,” Proceedings of a Workshop on 
Deterring Cyber Attacks: Informing Strategies and Developing Options for U.S. Policy, National Research 
Council (Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press), 43. 
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involves the analysis of all avenues of information pertinent to the attack to identify the 
person or organization responsible for the attack. Both aspects of attribution are a 
challenge owing to the multiple barriers (or techniques) by which attackers can mask 
their routes. These include the use of botnets, The Onion Router (TOR),40 and covert 
channels, etc. 
E. SOME CASES OF CYBER ATTACKS 
1. Conficker 
The Conficker worm is responsible for one of the largest worm infections to date. 
First detected on November 21, 2008, it spread to over seven million government, 
business, and home computers in over two hundred countries.41 Some of the more 
severely impacted victims include the French Navy,42 where fighter planes were 
grounded due to the worm infection, and the United Kingdom’s Navy, where as many as 
three-quarters of its ships had infected computers.43  Over a period of six months, the 
worm upgraded itself five times, each time adding new functionalities such as infection 
vectors, propagation and communications methods and even self-defense mechanisms. 
This illustrates how upgrades compound the difficulty in defending against such 
advanced malware. Each time a new defense mechanism is in place, such as an updated 
signature for the anti-virus or intrusion prevention system, the worm can be upgraded to 
defeat that mechanism. In this manner, defenses will always be one step behind attacks. 
2. GhostNet 
GhostNet refers to a massive case of cyber espionage against the Tibetan 
community, India, and other targets, allegedly perpetrated by China. Based on a study 
                                                
40 TOR is a network of virtual tunnels that allow users to anonymize their traffic. See 
http://www.torproject.org/about/overview.html.en. 
41 Conficker Working Group, 
http://www.confickerworkinggroup.org/wiki/pmwiki.php/ANY/Introduction. 
42 Kim Willsher, “French Fighter Planes Grounded by Computer Virus,” The Telegraph, 7 February  
2009, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/4547649/French-fighter-planes-
grounded-by-computer-virus.html. 
43 Lewis Page, “MoD Networks Still Malware-Plagued After Two Weeks,” The Register, 20 January 
2009, http://www.theregister.co.uk/2009/01/20/mod_malware_still_going_strong/. 
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conducted by Information Warfare Monitor, the GhostNet malware infected over 1300 
computers in 103 countries, of which as many as 30% were considered high-value targets 
located at various ministries of foreign affairs, embassies, and other government 
facilities.44 Through reverse engineering of the GhostNet system, the Information 
Warfare Monitor found a “covert, difficult-to-detect and elaborate cyber-espionage 
system capable of taking full control of affected systems.”45 However, despite the in-
depth research conducted by the Information Warfare Monitor, no conclusion could be 
drawn as to who was ultimately in control of GhostNet. The attackers’ IP addresses, 
while traced to Hainan Island, China, were insufficient to implicate any involvement of 
the Chinese government.  The computers with those IP addresses could have been 
compromised proxy computers used to deliberately mislead the true attacker. This attack 
emphasized two important issues. Many government networks continue to be vulnerable, 
and more importantly, attribution in cyber space is extremely difficult to establish. 
Attribution is especially important, because without solving it, appropriate actions cannot 
be carried out against a perpetrator. 
3. Stuxnet 
Stuxnet was the first worm targeted at industrial control systems. Such systems 
are used in gas pipelines and power plants. Attacks against these systems are especially 
serious because in the design of many industrial control systems, security has never been 
a focus, leaving these systems vulnerable. While Stuxnet shares similar characteristics 
with the Conficker worm, it is far more complex. Apart from utilizing very advanced 
techniques to achieve stealth capability and propagation via USB sticks, Stuxnet contains 
sophisticated code to reprogram a Program Logic Controller in order to cause physical 
damages (Stuxnet is believed to have damaged about one thousand centrifuges at Iran’s 
nuclear enrichment facility at Natanz) and exploits four zero-day vulnerabilities.46 While 
this worm was only discovered in July 2010, Symantec Security Response (SSR) was 
                                                
44 “Tracking GhostNet: Investigating a Cyber Espionage Network,” http://www.infowar-
monitor.net/ghostnet. 
45 Ibid., 6. 
46 “W32.Stuxnet Dossier Version 1.4.” 
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able to confirm that it existed at least one year prior to that. The SSR also observed over 
40,000 unique external IP addresses, spanning 155 countries. The successful spread of 
Stuxnet further brings to question whether existing cyber defenses are adequate, 
especially in the case of industrial control systems. 
F. CONCLUSION 
Cyber attacks have become more pervasive and more serious. This may be due to 
several factors, including an increase in the use of computers across many sectors such as 
government, military, industry, and finance; an increase in actors wishing to exploit and 
attack these computers for economic, political, and other advantages; and a growing 
supply of new vulnerabilities along with attack tools to exploit them, as well as all the 
previously discovered vulnerabilities that have not been fixed in victim computers. As 
presented by the different cases discussed, the attacks have also become increasingly 
sophisticated. Not only have they been able to defeat many of their targets’ cyber 
defenses, their perpetrators have been difficult to trace and identify. Apart from 
continuing to improve existing defenses, which are passive, there is a need to consider 
employing active cyber defenses. In the following chapters, the thesis will examine how 
active defenses have contributed to traditional warfare, and how some of the concepts 
could be applied to cyber defense. 
 19 
III. ACTIVE CYBER DEFENSE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
As mentioned earlier, active defenses refer to the employment of limited offensive 
actions (such as preventive and preemptive strikes) and counterattacks to deny a 
contested area or position to the enemy. These strategies have long been an integral part 
of traditional domains of warfare. They have been used to preempt a capability, to 
prevent a war, and to counter attacks.  
In the context of cyber defense, active defenses can be utilized in the same 
manner. This chapter will discuss the typologies of active cyber defense, what they can 
offer, and how they can help in defending against cyber attacks.  
B. TYPOLOGIES OF ACTIVE CYBER DEFENSE 
In broad terms, the typologies of active cyber defense can be categorized into 
exploitation, counter attack, preemptive attack, and preventive attack. 
1. Cyber Exploitation 
This typology refers to the exploitation of computer systems involved in a cyber 
attack in order to obtain intelligence that can aid in the analysis of the attack and in 
determining attribution. 
During or after a cyber attack, passive defenses such as forensics and auditing of 
logs can only reveal the IP addresses of the immediate attack sources. However, as 
discussed before, many attacks are launched through multiple hops, consisting of hacked 
computers. Thus, to determine the true origin of an attack, an effective way to trace 
through the attack path undertaken by the attacker is needed.  
One widely researched technique, which does not require any exploitation of the 
attacking computers, is IP traceback.47 However, this technique is not yet mature, 
                                                
47 Andrey Belenky and Nirwan Ansari, “IP Traceback with Deterministic Packet Marking,” IEEE 
Communications Letters 7, no. 4 (April 2003): 162. 
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resulting in compatibility and performance issues.48 Also, the attribution systems built on 
techniques such as IP traceback need to be implemented at as many ISPs as possible in 
order for results to be accurate.49  This raises the issue of cost. Without any financial 
gain, there is little motivation for the ISPs to implement attribution systems, even if they 
are working perfectly. Furthermore, the trustworthiness of the information may be 
questionable when a non-friendly country is involved.50 For illustration, there may be 
network traffic transmitted from the U.S. to Russia over a network that extends into the 
North Korean network. To what extent will the North Koreans be willing to cooperate to 
release attribution information? And even if they were willing to release the information, 
would it be reliable?  
Through cyber exploitation, these issues may be avoided. After obtaining the last 
IP address of the computer used by the attacker (based on results from forensics and log 
audits), the computer could be exploited or “hacked back.” After gaining access, in-depth 
analysis could determine the next system in the chain. By repeating the process, the 
attack path could be identified, eventually leading to the computer used for the attack.51 
Once that is achieved, forensic needs to be performed on this computer so as to determine 
the owner of the computer. By investigating the documents stored on the computer, web 
surfing history and cache files, e-mails, etc., the owner or user of that computer could be 
identified.52 The information retrieved from the investigation may then provide clues as 
to who the mastermind is, and whether a state is involved. For example, there could be an 
e-mail conversation or document containing instructions from some state official. 
However, that would be inconclusive since the official could be acting on his own accord. 
                                                
48 Ping Wang et al., “A New Approach for Solving the IP Traceback Problem for Web Security,” 
Advances on Information Sciences and Service Sciences 3, no. 2 (March 2011). 
49 Jeffrey Hunker, Bob Hutchinson, and Jonathan Margulies, “Role and Challenges for Sufficient 
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To get to the truth, more investigation would be needed. The official’s computer could be 
exploited. By monitoring his e-mails and documents, more clues and evidence may be 
gathered. In any case, there would be technical and legal considerations concerning such 
exploitation. These will be discussed at the end of this chapter.  
At this point, appropriate legal actions could be taken against the attacker, or if 
the attacker were a foreign government, actions such as economic sanctions, 
conventional/cyber counter attack, and others, could be taken. Or perhaps for strategic 
reasons, the defending nation may even choose not to reveal its knowledge of the 
attacker. Regardless, the capacity to undertake such a cyber exploitation to achieve a 
more thorough attack analysis and attribution leads to deterring potential attackers. 
Many attackers would take advantage of the very architecture of the Internet to 
mask their traces. In doing so, they could then carry out their attacks without any fear of 
being identified or facing other consequences. They would compile a pool of vulnerable 
computers that they have hacked, and subsequently log in through a series of these 
hacked computers before launching the attack.53 Alternatively, they could also connect 
via anonymous proxy servers or TOR to launder their traffic.54 While a counter attack on 
the attacker may not be possible until an actual location is determined, it can still be 
useful. As discussed previously, exploiting the various hacked computers would allow 
the reconstruction of the attack path, which in turn would reveal the location of the 
attacker. Once that is obtained, actions could be taken to disable the attacker’s systems. 
Knowing that he may no longer hide in the shadows of the Internet and that his systems 
may be attacked, he is likely to be further deterred. 
2. Counter Attack 
The U.S. Department of Defense defines counter attack as an “attack by part or all 
of a defending force against an enemy attacking force, for such specific purposes as 
regaining ground lost or cutting off or destroying enemy advance units, and with the 
                                                
53 Stuart Staniford-Chen, L. Todd Heberlein, “Holding Intruders Accountable on the Internet,” 
Proceedings 1995 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, IEEE, May 1995, 39. 
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general objective of denying to the enemy the attainment of the enemy’s purpose in 
attacking. In sustained defensive operations, it is undertaken to restore the battle position 
and is directed at limited objectives.”55 An example of a counter attack in history is the 
siege of Bastogne during the Second World War.  On December 20, 1944, the Germans 
laid siege at the town of Bastogne, Belgium, as part of their efforts to capture Antwerp. 
While the siege was ongoing, U.S. Lt. Col. Creighton Abrams, who later commanded U.S 
forces in Vietnam, led a counter attack against the Germans, and succeeded in punching 
through the German lines, thereby ending the seven-day siege.56 
In the case of a cyber attack, the equivalent would be to counter hack the attacker 
responsible for the cyber attack, instead of relying on more passive means such as a 
perimeter firewall or an intrusion prevention system to filter or block the attacks.57 One 
of the earliest examples of a cyber counter attack occurred in 1998. A group of activists 
by the name of the Electronic Disturbance Theater (EDT) had launched a “web sit-in” 
(DOS attack) against a Pentagon website. The Pentagon reacted by redirecting the 
incoming web traffic to a web application, which subsequently caused the attacker’s web 
browsers to crash, thereby neutralizing the attacks.58 
In another example, during the World Trade Organization (WTO) Summit in 
January 2000, the WTO server was the target of a DOS attack by Electrohippies (E-
hippies), an activist group based in the United Kingdom. Conxion Inc., the company at 
which the WTO server was hosted, was able to trace back the IP addresses to the E-
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hippies’ server. Instead of filtering the incoming attacks, Conxion redirected the attacks 
back to the E-hippies server, and was able to disable that server for several hours.59  
Both examples show how counter attacks have been used to effectively stop 
attacks. Counter attack does not just prevent the attacks from succeeding; it aims to 
prevent the attacker from launching further attacks. In the case of a DDOS attack carried 
out by a botnet controlled via C&C servers, counter attacks could be carried out either 
against the C&C servers or the computer/network of the attacker. 
This is identical to that of command and control warfare as described by Martin 
Libicki in What is Information Warfare? In conventional warfare, command and control 
systems are widely used to enhance battlefield communications and effectiveness. Libicki 
described an effective way to cripple the enemy’s command and control warfare system 
by decapitating the enemy’s command structure from its body of command forces.60 In 
the context of a DDOS attack from a botnet under centralized command and control, a 
similar approach would be to shut down the C&C servers. Since the bots receive their 
instructions from the C&C servers, doing so will prevent further instructions from 
propagating to the bots. It would also aid in neutralizing the attack. While backup C&C 
servers may surface, this process may be repeated until all C&C servers are shut down. 
An additional or alternative response would be to send out code to the bots, instructing 
them to be idle. Thereafter, their respective ISPs and security product vendors could be 
involved to work with the owners to remove the bots. 
If a sample of a bot code can be obtained, the code may contain the IP addresses 
or domain names of the C&C servers. Alternatively, the bot could be executed in a 
controlled environment, and be monitored closely as to where it tries to connect. Doing 
so can also reveal the whereabouts of the C&C servers. However, if no such sample is 
available, exploitation could be done on one of the bots involved in the DDOS attack. 
After gaining access to that bot, analysis could be performed. Once the IP addresses of 
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the C&C servers were discovered, an attack could be launched on that server to take it 
offline. Alternatively, relevant authorities and corresponding ISPs/owners could be 
notified so that the server could be cleaned up and, if necessary, seized for further 
investigations.  
A recent example of such a counter initiative is the taking down of the Coreflood 
botnet by the FBI in April 2011.61 The Coreflood botnet had infected over two million 
computers around the world, stealing the users’ credentials (usernames and passwords), 
and other personal and financial information. After obtaining a court order, the FBI 
proceeded to seize the five C&C servers and take down the twenty-nine Internet domain 
names used by Coreflood. With control over the C&C servers, the FBI also arranged for 
instructions to be propagated down to the bots that effectively placed them in a dormant 
state.  
In cases where the botnet’s command structure is based on a peer-to-peer (P2P) 
architecture instead of centralized C&C servers, the above operation would not work. 
Instead, other forms of counter attack would be required. However, since P2P bots 
propagate instructions to one another rather than retrieve the instructions from a central 
C&C server, it is possible to conduct a man-in-the-middle attack and intercept/manipulate 
the communications between the bots. In doing so, neutralizing instructions (such as 
instructing the bots to enter a dormant mode) could be transmitted to other bots.62 
Counter attack could also be useful as a form of deterrent. As Patrick Morgan 
explained, deterrence refers to “efforts to avoid being deliberately attacked by using 
threats to inflict unacceptable harm on the attacker in response.”63 He added that such 
harm could involve making the cost of attack too great for the attacker to continue, or it 
could be in the form of retaliation. In the context of a cyber attack, retaliation would 
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imply a counter cyber attack. Therefore, if the attacker knew that there could be a counter 
attack or retaliation, he would be more likely to be deterred.64 This is, however, 
contingent upon the defender’s ability to pierce through the attacker’s veil of anonymity. 
3. Preemptive Strikes 
A preemptive strike is one that uses “force against an attack that is believed to be 
imminent based on evidence that hostile action has begun or is about to occur.”65 As with 
counter attack, preemption has been seen throughout military history.66 For example, in 
1967, Israel believed it was launching a preemptive war against Egypt when the latter 
massed its troops on Israel’s borders.67  
In the context of cyberspace, a preemptive strike can be described as “conducting 
an attack on a system or network in anticipation of that system or networking conducting 
an attack on your system.”68 Assuming a scenario where a state (Blue) has gathered 
intelligence that a hostile state (Red) has plans to mount a cyber attack against it, Blue 
can launch a preemptive cyber operation against Red. Doing so can help achieve the 
following: 
1) Cripple the enemy’s attack capability. In the case of the Six Day War in 1967, 
the moment Israel found out that Egypt had been building up its troops at Israel’s borders, 
Israel launched an attack against the Arabs. The preemptive attack by the Israeli forces 
destroyed nearly four hundred Egypt-based military aircraft.69 In the cyber operation 
mentioned above, upon penetrating Red’s networks, Blue can cripple Red’s cyber attack 
capability through the disruption of Red’s network.  
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2) Deterrence. Upon infiltrating Red’s network, Blue can subtly make its presence 
known, thereby alerting Red that its network has been compromised. Doing so might 
deter Red from launching an attack on Blue. This is described by W. Earl Boebert in the 
NRC report, as the “awareness on the part of potential attackers that such “cyber 
patrolling” was being conducted and would in and of itself act as a deterrent, since they 
would be faced with additional security tasks as well as the uncertainty as to the degree to 
which they may themselves have been penetrated and placed at risk.”70 
4. Preventive Strikes 
While conceptually a preventive strike may seem similar to a preemptive strike, 
there is an important distinction. As Abraham Sofaer described, a preventive strike is the 
“use of force against an anticipated attack based on a judgment that the attacker will use 
existing or potential means to attack in the future, or to engender other types of harm, 
including, for example, harm to hostages, attacks by non-state actors, or the mistreatment 
by a State of its own nationals.”71 This implies that such an attack is launched before any 
non-imminent attack or threat that does not qualify as an attack under international law.72 
A good example of a preventive strike occurred in 1981, when Israel launched an 
attack on the nuclear reactor at Osirak, in Iraq. At that time, the uranium-powered reactor 
was nearing completion, but there were no signs of its being stocked with nuclear fuel. 
However, Israel claimed that the reactor would be capable of producing devastating 
nuclear weapons, and that it could not allow such an enemy to develop weapons of mass 
destruction against Israelis.73  
With a similar argument, a preventive cyber attack can be launched against a 
hostile actor (both state and non-state) to prevent the latter from acquiring any cyber 
offensive capability. It can also achieve the similar deterrent effect as with the case of a 
preemptive attack mentioned above. That is, when the hostile actor realized that its 
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network had been compromised, it might think twice about pursuing cyber attack 
capability. However, a preventive cyber attack can also be extended to a non-cyber 
related offensive capability. A good example of this would be Stuxnet, the first computer 
worm targeted at industrial systems, or more specifically at nuclear facilities.74 While 
Stuxnet spread to computers around the world, the infection was concentrated mainly in 
Iran.75 It appears that the creator of Stuxnet intended to use the worm to prevent the 
buildup of nuclear weapon capability in Iran. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad also 
publicly acknowledged that Stuxnet had disrupted Iran’s nuclear program.76 As it seems, 
the Stuxnet has already encouraged emulation by others, as evident by the Duqu 
malware. As reported by Symantec, Duqu has been labeled as a precursor to the next 
Stuxnet.77 
C. LIMITATIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS 
The typologies mentioned in this chapter are not without their limitations. First of 
all, such measures are very controversial and may violate certain international laws. 
Secondly, even if such measures can be justified, there are technical challenges.  
1. Technical Aspects  
One of the key success factors in utilizing active cyber defenses is the ability to 
launch a cyber attack. For the counter strike to be successful, the active defender needs to 
be able to exploit vulnerabilities in the systems used by the attacker.78 While the attacker 
is likely to be using computers that he has previously hacked (intermediate computers), 
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he is also likely to have patched any known vulnerabilities on those intermediate 
computers.79 As such, it could take massive efforts to research a new vulnerability that 
would allow the counter attack to succeed. This poses a big challenge because such 
research can be time consuming. If it takes too long, it would delay the counter attack 
resulting in more extensive damages to the defender. Furthermore, this delay would also 
create a wider window of opportunity for the attacker to mask his traces and/or further 
secure the intermediate computers. Just as in the siege of Bastogne, should Lt. Col. 
Abrams have delayed his counter attack by a few more days, the allies’ casualties would 
have risen considerably. The Germans could also have had reinforcements in place, 
thereby strengthening their positions to repel the counter attack. 
One possibility to address the timeliness issue is to allocate more resources to 
discovering vulnerabilities. Unfortunately, that in itself is a challenge, as there is a severe 
shortage of cyber security experts.80 The research could be performed in advance, but this 
requires identifying the systems used by potential adversaries. Such information could be 
acquired from exploitation or other sources of intelligence and then used to steer the 
research, resulting in readiness for a counter, preemptive, or preventive attack. 
2. Legal Aspects 
Assuming technical concerns are overcome, there are still legal issues relating to 
the use of active defenses. Traditionally, active defenses have been controversial. For 
example, after the Israeli bombing of the Osirak nuclear reactor in June 1981, there was a 
broad agreement among various nations that the bombing was unacceptable. The Reagan 
administration condemned the attack and the British government claimed that the action 
had violated international law.81 Should a state carry out a cyber attack against another 
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state on the basis of preventing a potential threat from occurring, it would likely draw 
critical scrutiny from nations around the world. 
Based on the International Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC), a state must have 
“good” reasons for using force or violence against another state.82 Articles 39 and 42 of 
the UN Charter “permit the Security Council to authorize uses of force in response to 
‘any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression’ in order to ‘maintain or 
restore international peace and security.’” Article 51 adds that “Nothing in the present 
Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed 
attack occurs…”83 Thus, in the cyber context, when would it be legal for a nation to 
launch a cyber attack (counter attack, preventive attack, or preemptive attack) against 
another? What would the “good” reasons be? Assuming the reasons were adequate, what 
would the rules that govern the use of a cyber attack be?  
What about exploitation of the intermediate system? In the case of Coreflood, the 
FBI, after obtaining the court order, seized several of the servers. Thereafter, they were 
able to fully analyze the hardware legally. However, what would happen when an 
intermediate system was located in a foreign country? This could be a complex issue 
because different countries would have different laws, interests, and even capacity to 
handle the situation.84 Or perhaps the foreign country could be on unfriendly or non-
cooperative terms. The Council of Europe’s Convention on Cybercrime aims to 
harmonize state laws and foster inter-state cooperation, but not all countries have signed 
on or agreed to its principles.85  
Given these factors, when would it be legal to proceed with an exploitation?  And 
in the process of the exploitation, who will be held responsible should the system become 
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unstable? Also, legitimate users of that system could have their privacy violated. For 
example, sniffers could be deployed to analyze the network traffic passing through the 
system and documents could be extracted as part of a forensic investigation. The sniffers 
could reveal the users’ credentials to other systems, and the documents might contain 
private information. Proceeding with such exploitation could possibly violate the privacy 
of individuals or other domestic laws of that country. As such, could legal actions be 
taken against the party responsible for the exploitation/investigation? Furthermore as 
Kesan and Hayer cautioned in their paper, Mitigative Counterstriking, such hostile 
actions could escalate into kinetic armed conflict.86 
D. CONCLUSION 
The discussion presented in this chapter has shown that active cyber defenses can 
be useful in defending against cyber attacks. They can help address attribution; deter 
potential attackers; and mitigate, preempt, and prevent cyber attacks. However, this does 
not imply that active cyber defenses can replace passive defenses. Passive defenses are 
still required as part of an overall cyber defense posture. For example, passive defenses 
can be used to block the attacker, while active defenses can be used to go after the 
attacker, thereby preventing him from launching further attacks.  
The use of active defenses is likely to continue to generate controversy, 
particularly due to the unanswered questions listed earlier. Regardless, active cyber 
defenses will need to be executed within the context of an overall strategy that takes into 
account the above issues to ensure that the benefits outweigh the costs and risks. Active 
defenses are a double-edged sword and have the potential to do more harm than good if 
not implemented with utmost care and in adherence to laws and ethical principles.  
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IV. CASE STUDIES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines three of the more prominent cases of cyber attacks in 
recent history. They are GhostNet, the cyber espionage incident that affected 103 
countries;87 massive cyber attacks against Estonia;88 and Stuxnet, the first computer 
worm targeted at industrial systems.89 The chapter will describe the attacks and discuss 
how active cyber defense could have played a part in defending against them.   
B. GHOSTNET 
1. Overview 
GhostNet was touted as the largest spying operation to have been uncovered at the 
time, based on the number of affected countries.90 A ten-month investigation by the 
Information Warfare Monitor (IWM) discovered that GhostNet had infected 1,295 
computers in 103 countries. As many as thirty percent of these computers were deemed 
high-value targets. They included computers belonging to various ministries of foreign 
affairs and embassies.91 The Figure 4 depicts the geographical locations of the 
compromised computers. 
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Figure 4.    The vast reach of GhostNet92 
2. The Investigation 
The primary mode of infection in GhostNet was social engineering. The attacker 
first sent an e-mail with an attachment to the target with an appealing message to entice 
the target to open the attachment. Once the target opened the attachment, the target’s 
computer proceeded to download and install the Gh0st RAT malware.93 Gh0st RAT is a 
Remote Access Trojan that allowed the attacker to have near unrestricted access to the 
infected computers.94 The Trojan connected to command and control servers on the 
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Internet to retrieve instructions. The instructions could command the software to transmit 
any files to and from a remote computer, activate the webcam or microphone, or other 
directives.95  
By monitoring the computers in Dharamsala and at various Tibetan missions, 
IWM was able to determine the IP addresses of the servers hosting Gh0st RAT and for 
command and control. With further analysis, four hosting servers and six command and 
control servers were mapped out. Three of the four hosting servers were located in China. 
The fourth was located in the U.S. Five of the six command and control servers were 
located in China, with the sixth in Hong Kong.96  
While the majority of the command and control servers’ IP addresses were traced 
back to China, the Chinese government denied any involvement.97 Without concrete 
evidence, identity of the perpetrator remains a problem. And as IWM rightfully pointed 
out, GhostNet “could have been conducted by a state other than China, but using servers 
within China for strategic purposes.”98 Thus, despite the in-depth analysis by IWM, it is 
uncertain as to the identity of the true culprit. 
3. How Could Active Cyber Defenses Have Helped in This Scenario? 
In this scenario, active cyber defense might be able to do what IWM failed to do, 
that is, to reconstruct the attack path and identify the actual attacker. The IWM mentioned 
in its report that its network trace had ended at the location of the command and control 
servers, and that it was not conclusive as to who was behind GhostNet. As such, a more 
affirmative way to deduce the attacker’s identity would have been to monitor the 
command servers and then determine who was uploading the instructions. This can be 
done in two ways. First would be to involve the authorities and service providers of the 
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country where the C&C servers are located. This approach would be similar to that taken 
with Coreflood, where the FBI first obtained a court order before seizing the servers.99 
With access to the servers, logs and other data on the servers can be analyzed to help 
trace and identify the person who uploaded the instructions for Gh0st RAT. In one 
instance, IWM found that stolen files were uploaded to a C&C server located in Beijing, 
China.100 In a situation when cooperation from the authorities and/or service providers is 
lacking, this C&C server could have be exploited. For example, hacking into the C&C 
server would allow data to be examined and analyzed that would otherwise be impossible 
to acquire. Thereafter, the attacker could be traced in the same manner described above.  
Another way to conduct cyber exploitation is to adopt the original concept of the 
Trojan Horse as used by the Greeks when they wanted to gain entrance into Troy.101 In 
the cyber context, backdoors could be embedded in seemingly important documents 
located within the computers infected by GhostRat. When the attacker retrieved and 
opened these documents, his computer would be compromised. Thereafter instructions 
could be sent to the backdoor to extract system and network information, to be used to 
determine the location and identity of the attacker. Of course, this will only work if the 
attacker opens the documents and the backdoor is successfully installed. Subsequently, 
Internet access is required in order for the information to be sent out.  
C. CYBER ATTACK ON ESTONIA 
1. Overview 
In April 2007, Estonia experienced a massive cyber attack that nearly shut down 
the nation’s digital infrastructure. The attack lasted from April 27, 2007, to May 18, 
2007, and occurred in parallel to the rioting in the streets as part of a protest against the 
Estonian government for relocating a Soviet-era Second World War memorial.102 While 
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the media described this attack as “the first war in cyberspace,”103 others termed it a 
“cyber riot.”104 Regardless, the impact was significant due to Estonia’s high dependency 
on the Internet. Online sites belonging to various government agencies, newspapers, 
banks, and Internet service providers were severely disrupted during this period.  
The attacks were carried out in four waves and consisted of DDOS and web 
defacement attacks.105 The government targets included the Estonian Government 
Briefing Room, the Estonian Ministry of Defense, leading political parties, and the 
parliament. The private sector targets included two of the largest banks in Estonia, three 
news organizations, and telephone exchanges.106 Notably, 97 percent of Estonians are 
dependent on e-banking, further signifying the seriousness of the attack.107 
2. Responding to the Attacks 
The Estonian CERT, system administrators, and top IT experts worked together to 
respond to the attack. The first technical response was to increase the bandwidth or 
throughput capacity to the targets so they could handle more traffic.108 By May 10, 2007, 
the bandwidth capacity for the Estonian government networks had increased several 
times above its regular capacity. Apart from this, other technical measures were in place 
as well. Security patches were installed; firewall rules configured to filter out the 
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not stop all the attacks. It was reported that the attackers managed to obtain inside 
information on the attack and were able to adjust their attacks to overcome the 
defenses.109  
Other responses included support coming from the international community. For 
example, U.S. governmental institutions tried to help locate and shut down various 
sources of attack.110 However, this was not an easy task. Arbor Networks reported that 
the attacks originated from all over the world instead of from a few locations.111 The 
Estonian Informatics Centre, which was responsible for Estonia’s information systems 
and the Internet, confirmed the attacks were from as many as 178 countries.112 Also, the 
attackers intentionally moved the C&C servers to countries that were on unfriendly terms 
with Estonia, thereby preventing any potential cooperation in stopping the attacks or 
apprehending the culprits.113 As a result, not all the C&C servers used by the botnets 
could be shut down.  
Toward the end of May 2007, the attacks gradually stopped. This came about as 
news spread that the criminals responsible for the attacks were being brought to 
justice.114 This was confirmed when NATO reported that the attackers had stopped their 
attacks deliberately rather than being shut down.115  
3. How Could Active Cyber Defenses Have Helped in This Scenario? 
The initial wave of attacks was traced to individuals with Russian nationalist 
sympathies who carried out the attacks by following instructions posted on various 
Internet forums and websites.116 For the individuals who lacked the sophistication to 
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spoof their IP addresses, passive defenses such as auditing the logs sufficed to trace their 
identities. As for the more experienced perpetrators, access to the intermediate computers 
used for laundering their network traffic was needed in order to trace them. For 
computers located in the less friendly countries, cyber exploitation might have been used 
to gain access. Thereafter, with more analysis, subsequent cyber attacks could be 
launched to shut down the attackers’ systems. If the computers were located in friendly 
countries, the computers could be seized and analyzed through legal means. 
Subsequent waves of attacks were observed to be highly coordinated and had 
central command and control features.117  As mentioned in chapter three, one way to stop 
such attacks is to take down the C&C servers. If they are found to be located in a 
cooperative country, the approach against the Coreflood botnet can be adopted. If not, 
cyber exploitations and attacks could be used to try to shut down the attacks. For 
example, after obtaining the IP address of an attacking computer from the firewall logs, 
that attacking computer could be exploited. After that, a thorough analysis on that 
computer could be conducted, potentially revealing the IP address of the C&C server. 
Thereafter, the C&C server can be exploited so as to determine the culprit responsible for 
the attack. To stop further attacks, the server can be shutdown through a cyber attack.  
Several of the IP addresses involved in the attack were traced to Russia, with 
some of them belonging to Russian state institutions.118 However, given that the 
computers themselves could have been compromised and under the control of a botnet 
owner, there was insufficient evidence to determine the true culprit.119 While the Russian 
government was accused of the attacks, it denied allegations.120  However, the true 
attacker may have been determined if the attack computers in Russia could have been 
examined for further analysis. Of course, that would have required cooperation from the 
Russian ISPs and authorities. But, if that were lacking, the computers could have been 
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exploited remotely so that the analysis could be carried out. Likewise, botnets located 
elsewhere and involved in the attacks could be approached in the same manner.    
Another possibility of employing active cyber defense in this scenario would be to 
tamper with the script used for the cyber attacks. As reported, a downloadable batch of 
scripts designed to ping flood Estonian websites were posted to several Russian language 
message boards.121 Given the lack of cooperation from Russia,122 the sites hosting these 
message boards could have been hacked. Thereafter the script could be modified so that it 
would do something instead of launching the attack. At the same time, the sites could be 
monitored to track the attacker’s whereabouts. 
D. STUXNET 
1. Overview 
The first of its kind, Stuxnet is a sophisticated computer worm that targets 
industrial control systems. It was first discovered on computers in Iran by VirusBlokAda, 
an IT security firm based in Belarus, in June 2010.123 However, from the in-depth 
analysis by Symantec, the worm was confirmed to have existed at least one year prior.124 
The worm spreads by exploiting several software vulnerabilities in the Microsoft 
Windows operating systems, and is capable of spreading via removable devices (such as 
USB drives). After infecting a new computer, the worm can contact a command and 
control server for any instructions, including upgrading itself. This worm was designed to 
locate specific industrial control systems and modify the code on the corresponding 
Siemens programmable logic controllers (PLCs) for malicious purposes.125 Some sources 
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have suggested that Stuxnet was designed to sabotage Iran’s Bushehr nuclear reactor.126  
Others suggested that Stuxnet targeted the nuclear facility at Natanz, due to its particular 
configuration.127 As reported by Symantec, Stuxnet sought out very specific industrial 
control systems, and 60 percent of the 100,000 infected computers were located in 
Iran.128  
2. How Could Active Cyber Defenses Have Helped in This Scenario? 
Since Stuxnet was discovered, several resources have been made available to 
guide others in terms of defending against industrial control system attacks.129 However, 
they are passive in nature, and may not be sufficient in determining the identity of the 
attacker as discussed in the earlier chapter. As with the other cases mentioned above, 
active cyber defenses could have helped address the issue of attribution. While Iranian 
intelligence claimed that enemy spy services were responsible for Stuxnet, there is 
inadequate evidence to prove this. As published by Symantec, several references within 
the Stuxnet code could simply have been misdirection on the part of the attackers.130 
Apart from the references, Symantec found that the command and control servers used by 
Stuxnet were located in Malaysia and Denmark.131 These servers could have been seized 
or exploited via cyber means to gain insight to the attackers. If the identity of the 
attackers could be confirmed, appropriate legal and/or political actions could follow. 
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Another possible active cyber defense for this case is in the form of cyber counter 
attack. Based on the study by Symantec, there was a possible attack scenario in which an 
early version of Stuxnet or other malicious binary would steal and upload the industrial 
control system (ICS) schematics from compromised systems to some servers.132 
Thereafter, the attacker would develop a newer version of Stuxnet, tailored specifically 
for the ICS facility.  
In this setting, special Trojans could be embedded in the documents containing 
the schematics. When the documents are accessed on a friendly computer, the Trojan will 
not take any actions. (Unique signatures could be hidden within the computers of 
legitimate users thereby allowing the Trojan to identify them as friendly computers. Any 
other computers accessing the document will then be deemed as hostile.) However, if the 
documents are accessed on a hostile computer, the Trojan will become active. It will 
capture system and network information, and send it back to the investigators alerting 
them of the compromise. This information, together with various documents extracted 
from the hostile computer, can assist in identifying the attacker.  
In addition, some of the documents with the ICS schematics could contain 
misleading or false information. When attackers try to interpret the information, they will 
be led astray. 
Regardless, Stuxnet has demonstrated a new threat to ICS. As Ralph Langner, a 
well-respected expert in industrial control systems security, pointed out, “The problem is 
not Stuxnet. Stuxnet is history. The problem is the next generation of malware that will 
follow.”133 Stuxnet has shown the world that it is possible to cripple industrial control 
systems, and that is an attractive option for hostile states (and non-states alike). The 
Poneman Institute reported that the majority of companies in the energy sector are not 
prepared to defend against such threats.134 To make things worse, the source code of 
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Stuxnet has been made available on the Internet.135  This implied that new and perhaps 
even more sophisticated variants of Stuxnet could be created with greater ease. In view of 
this, it is crucial to strengthen measures to deter potential attackers. As Patrick Morgan 
highlighted, a good cyber deterrence posture needs to include “capacities for suitable 
retaliation.”136 Cyber exploitation could contribute to attributing the attacker, while cyber 
counter attack would be a suitable retaliation.137  
E. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has shown how active cyber defenses could have made a difference 
in three major incidents, particularly in the areas of attribution. Should there be sufficient 
intelligence suggesting an imminent threat, a corresponding preemptive cyber attack can 
be launched against the hostile state, thereby preventing the cyber attack. 
Active cyber defenses could be employed in ways similar to that of espionage and 
covert actions conducted by intelligence agencies. For example, according to Dr. David 
Perry from the University of Santa Clara, the CIA has recruited agents in foreign 
countries to help provide intelligence, as well as plot assassinations of various foreign 
leaders.138 In a cyber context, the computer network of a hostile state could be exploited 
and network sensors installed. These sensors could have functionalities similar to those of 
an intrusion detection system or network packet sniffer. When the sensors detect 
activities that suggest the threat of a cyber attack, the network or corresponding servers 
could be disrupted and/or shutdown.  
While such active cyber defenses may be considered inappropriate, some have 
argued that these are acceptable as they are part of self-defense. One such individual is 
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Professor Jay Kesan of the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. In his 
forthcoming paper “Mitigative Counterstrike: Self-Defense and Deterrence in 
Cyberspace,” he argues that self-defense “is accepted as an essential element of 
protection in virtually all other legal contexts, and should be preserved in the cyber 
realm.”139 In the case of the cyber attacks on Estonia, this argument suggests that Estonia 
could have conducted cyber exploitation and/or attacks on the Russian ISPs (where the 
attacks were last traced to) as a form of self-defense. 
                                                




This thesis has studied different types of cyber attacks and the limitations of 
existing passive defenses against them. It has proposed augmenting these passive 
measures with active ones and explored typologies of active cyber defenses and the 
benefits they can offer to an overall cyber defense posture. Three prominent cases of 
cyber attacks were used to illustrate how active cyber defenses could have made 
differences in defending against the attacks. 
Active cyber defenses are not meant to replace passive defenses. Rather, they are 
meant to complement the latter, and should be considered in any national level cyber 
program. This concluding chapter summarizes the benefits and typologies of active cyber 
defense. It briefly lays down some technical and legal considerations, and then highlights 
some areas of possible future research.  
B. ACTIVE CYBER DEFENSE 
Active cyber defenses may one day offer strategic advantages similar to those for 
active defenses in conventional warfare. They can help establish attribution of a cyber 
attack, deter attacks by creating the fear of retaliatory attacks in potential attackers, or 
even preempt an imminent attack. The typologies of active cyber defense are cyber 
exploitation, counter cyber attack, preemptive cyber attack, and preventive cyber attack.   
Cyber exploitation refers to the hacking of third party or the attackers’ computers 
and networks for the purpose of gaining information about the attack, including the 
source of the attack, the methods and tools used, the scope of the attack, and data that 
may have been taken. Cyber exploitation, when carefully carried out, need not disrupt 
target computers and may even goes undetected.  
Counter cyber attack refers to the launching of a cyber attack against an attacker. 
The objective could be to interrupt an attack in progress and limit its effects. The counter 
attack could take the form of DOS attack or intrusion into the attacker’s network. 
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Alternatively, if the attacker is stealing sensitive documents, it could take the form of 
booby-trapping the documents with a remote-controlled Trojan, which then could be used 
to collect information about the attacker and/or shut down the attacker’s computer or 
network. 
Preemptive cyber attack refers to the launching of a cyber attack against an 
adversary in anticipation of an imminent cyber attack. Preventive cyber attack refers to 
the launching of a cyber attack against an adversary based on a judgment that the 
adversary will be attacking. 
C. CONSIDERATIONS 
1. Technical Considerations 
In order to employ active cyber defenses successfully, the defender must have the 
capability to launch a cyber exploitation or cyber attack. Unless the defender is launching 
a simple DOS attack, this means that the defender must be able to exploit some 
vulnerability on the attacking computer or network. To improve the chances of success, it 
would be best to exploit a zero-day vulnerability since known vulnerabilities may have 
been patched on the target system. However, exploiting a zero-day vulnerability requires 
either an internal research program or access to researchers who are willing to provide 
information and exploit tools for zero-days on a confidential and sole-source basis. 
Finding zero-day vulnerabilities can be resource intensive, particularly when the 
researchers do not have access to the software code and need to reverse engineer the 
software. Even if the software code is available, the process of code auditing can be 
onerous due to the lengthy lines of code and vast numbers of software and hardware 
systems to investigate. To make matters worse, the process needs to be ongoing. New 
versions of software and operating systems are rolled out periodically, and it is uncertain 
when they will be adopted. When that happens, previously found zero-day vulnerabilities 
would likely be rendered useless. While there is a market for buying and selling zero-day 
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vulnerabilities,140 it is still important for any government to have its own capability, or a 
set of dedicated researchers who are working toward it. The reason is that the government 
would need to verify the zero vulnerability (or exploit) it intends to purchase, as well as 
subsequently develop or customize the exploit to suit its needs. Also, without the 
dedicated resource, it may not be able to react promptly when faced with a cyber attack. 
To limit the impact of a cyber attack, it is crucial to stop the attack quickly. This 
means that the defender must have cyber tools for active defense, including zero-day 
exploit tools, ready at hand, along with the knowledge about how to use them. In an 
analogy to conventional warfare, for a counter attack to be useful, the defender must first 
have troops that are well trained in warfare. If the defender only starts drafting soldiers 
and training them when an adversary is attacking, it will be too late. A city may be 
overrun before any counter attack can take place. Soldiers need to be trained and well 
equipped, so that they can be deployed at any time. In the cyber aspect, the defender must 
have adequate exploits in place to launch a successful counter attack. Moreover, if the 
defender intends to booby-trap sensitive documents that the attacker is downloading, the 
defender needs to be able to detect the attacker’s activity and insert a Trojan into the 
stolen files while the attack is in progress and without slowing down the attacker’s 
downloads.  
2. Nontechnical Considerations 
Conducting cyber attacks, including active cyber defense, is controversial. Widely 
accepted principles for fighting conventional wars have been encoded in the international 
law of armed conflict (LOAC), which includes the Geneva and Hague Conventions, and 
the UN Charter. But what about cyber attacks? Would it be legal and ethical under the 
LOAC to conduct a defensive cyber attack (be it a counter, preventive, or preemptive 
attack) against another nation? And what would the appropriate justifications be? In the 
cyber attack against Estonia, given the lack of assistance from the Russian government, 
                                                





would it have been acceptable for Estonia to launch a cyber attack or exploitation against 
those computers in Russia? Or in the case of GhostNet, would it have been lawful for the 
various countries infected by Gh0st RAT to conduct cyber exploitations and counter 
cyber attacks against the service providers and computers located in China? Would 
attacking the service providers, being uninvolved third parties, have been deemed 
acceptable collateral damages? In conventional war, these actions could be defended on 
the basis of self-defense when non-excessive collateral damage is often acceptable. 
However, at present, there is considerable uncertainly in addressing these issues under 
international law and the lack of a unified framework.141 Finally, apart from these, the 
ethics of cyber attacks need to be considered too. 
D. FURTHER RESEARCH  
Looking at the above-mentioned considerations, there are some possible avenues 
for future research. One important issue to note is that the research time required to find 
new vulnerabilities and exploits needs to be reduced. As discussed, often computer 
systems are upgraded with newer versions of software. If it takes too long to find a zero-
day vulnerability, then a working exploit may not be available when the need for a 
counter cyber attack arises. At present, researchers rely on both manual efforts and 
automated tools, such a fuzzer,142 to send multiple malformed data into software, forcing 
them to crash. Then, by analyzing the crash information and further manipulation of the 
malformed data, the researcher may be able to generate software code to exploit the 
vulnerability that caused the crash. However, this whole process is challenging and 
tedious and often fails to yield results. As such, any research in improving the process of 
vulnerability detection and exploit generation would be very helpful. 
Another possible area of research would be in the automation of Trojan injection 
into documents. One of the counter cyber attack examples described above involves the 
insertion of a Trojan into documents that the attacker was detected to be downloading. 
An automated system needs to be in place to facilitate that detection and automatically 
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insert the Trojan into the relevant documents. This could be something similar to that of 
an Intrusion Detection System (IDS), but with the ability to alter the content of the 
documents in real time. 
A third area of research is in the policy area. As Professor Jay Kesan mentioned in 
his paper “Mitigative Counterstrike,” there is a need “to legally solidify the right to use 
self-defense in cyberspace, while also protecting the rights of potential uninvolved third 
parties who might be harmed by mitigative counterstrikes.”143 Thus, further research 
could be conducted so as to construct a framework for new cyber-specific legal principles 
that could be adopted by the international community. The framework should 
complement existing international laws and address the use of active cyber defenses, 
particularly conditions under which their use would be appropriate; privacy issues; and 
collateral damage. In this regard, the U.S. has reportedly started crafting such a legal 
framework.144 However, until it is completed and accepted by other nations in the world, 
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